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INTRODUCTION

After Jordan acceded to the World Trade Organization (WTO) on
April 11, 2000, Jordan's Government adopted a new economic policy,
which Jordan's legal system has developed in the ten years since then.
Jordan originally undertook the economic reforms to bring its economic
policies and trade regime into compliance with the WTO agreements.3
Existing special legislation involving intellectual property rights
was amended, new legislation was drafted, and new Laws of Standards
and Metrology, Agriculture, National Production Protection, General
Sales Tax, Customs, Import and Export as well as non-Jordanians'
Investments Regulations were issued.4
On the other hand, and as a result of joining the WTO, Jordan
liberalized its trade and services sectors, providing market access to
foreign investors and service providers of WTO Members in accordance
with Jordanian laws and regulations.
There is a strong demand for a well-organized marketplace that
aims to offer a good business environment and well-informed consumer.
The impact of globalization is leading to increased marketplace
activity in Jordan. This increase in activity has manifold sources, such as
lowered trade barriers, cross-border investment in Jordan by
multinational firms, privatization of state-owned entities, and
government downsizing.
Given this increase in market activities,
governments should implement measures to avoid harm that could be
caused by abuse of these marketplace developments.
The Competition Law6 was issued by Jordan's government on
August 15, 2002, as provisional law.7 It was then approved by Jordan's

3. Ministry of Industry & Trade, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan: Jordan and
the World Trade Organization, http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=810 (last
visited Oct. 16, 2010).
4. See id See also MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE, http://www.mit.gov.jo/
tabid/36/default.aspx (last visited Oct. 16, 2010) (providing additional information about
Jordanian economic issues).
5. Derek Ireland, Competition Policy and Consumer Protection, POLICY OPTIONS,
Oct. 1997, at 27-28, availableat http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct97/ireland.pdf.
6.

Competition Law, No. 33, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No. 4673

at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (replacing Competition Temporary Law, No. 49 (2002)),
availableat http://www.mit.govjo/portals//competitionlaw.pdf
7. Provisional law is issued by the government, not the Parliament. THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE HASHEMITE KINGDOM OF JORDAN Jan. 1, 1952, ch. 5, pt. 3, art. 94

(Jordan), available at

http://www.kinghussein.govjo/constitutionjo.html.

See

Competition Temporary Law, No. 49, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No.
4560 at 3836 (Aug. 15, 2002) (Jordan); see also MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE,

http://www.mit.govjo/Default.aspx?tabid=715 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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Parliament as a permanent law on September 1, 2004. It is called the
Competition Law No. 33 for the Year 2004.
The Competition Law aims to establish mechanisms necessary to
ensure the proper functioning of Jordan's markets, and to protect and
promote competition in Jordan.9
The Law is geared to allow market mechanisms and principles of
free competition to determine prices, except for prices of basic
commodities such as bread and fuel, which are regulated by other laws,
and temporary price controls set by the government to cope with
exceptional circumstances.' 0
The scdpe of the Competition Law is expanding to cover all goods,
services and commerce in Jordan, as well as any economic activities that
occur outside of but having an effect in Jordan." Economic activities
will affect both the business sector and consumers; therefore, it is
important to clarify the relation between the competition policy and
consumer-protection policy and pinpoint any conflict between them.
In this article, I will elucidate the relation between the competition
policy and consumer-protection policy by drawing out the common
issues and differences between them. I will then discuss what kind of
governmental body should be in charge of applying competition policy
and consumer-protection policy.

8. Competition Law, No. 33, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No. 4673
at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.govjo/portals/O/
competition_1aw.pdf.
9.

RUBA QALYOUBI,

COMPETITION LAW IN THE ARAB COUNTRIES-JORDAN AS A

CASE STUDY 42 (JosefDrexl ed., Staimpfli 2008).
10. Competition Law, No. 33, art. 4, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No.

4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.gov.jolportals/0/
competitionlaw.pdf. The government rarely sets prices under the exceptionalcircumstances exception. There is no clear methodology for identifying what constitutes
an exceptional circumstance. On August 21, 2010, the Minister of Industry and Trade,
Amer Hadidi, stated that the government would set the price of basic goods if the prices
rose to unusual limits. But the Minister did not clarify how the prices would be set, nor
precisely what constitutes "unusual limits." The prices set by the government would
remain effective until the Council of Ministers ended the price adjustment. Under Article
7 of the Industry and Trade Law, the Council of Ministers can set the prices of any basic
goods. Article 1 of the Industry and Trade Law states that a basic good is any good that
the Council deems to be a basic good. Thus, if the Council deems a product to be a basic
good, the Council can set a price for it. See Ministry of Industry and Trade: The
Government Would Set the Price of Basic Goods if Prices Rise To Unusual Limits, ALRAI NEWSPAPER, Dec. 8, 2010, availableat http://www.manbaralrai.com/?q-node/79308.
11. Competition Law, No. 33, art. 3, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No.
4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/
competitionlaw.pdf.
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JORDANIAN ECONOMIC POLICY
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The Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT) is the main authority that
applies and organizes Jordan's economic policies by implementing

several laws and regulations.12
Regarding the relationship between competition policy and
consumer-protection policy, two directorates, the Competition
Directorate and Markets Control Directorate, could be considered the
interested governmental bodies that apply the competition and consumerprotection policies.
An analysis of the regulations that organize the two directorates'
tasks will set forth major elements of the relationship between
competition and consumer-protection policies.
A.

Competition Directorate

The Competition Directorate was established in late 2002'1 as a part
of the MIT. The Competition Directorate was entrusted with authority to
implement the Competition Law.
The Competition Directorate's tasks are to:14
1. Spread competition culture in Jordan.
2. Apply Jordan's competition policy.
3. Conduct the necessary investigations of practices that may
be anti-competitive."
4. Receive complaints, economic-concentration requests, 6
exemptions requests,' 7 and follow them up.
12. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 4, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan. 10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/551/Industry%20and%2OTrade%2OLaw.aspx.
13. For additional information about the establishment of the Competition
Directorate,

see

MINISTRY

OF

INDUSTRY

AND

TRADE,

http://www.mit.gov.jo/

Default.aspx?tabid=1174. (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
14.

Competition Law, No. 33, art. 12, Al-Jarida AI-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE],

No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.govjo/portals/
0/competition law.pdf.
15. Anti-competitive cartel operation, market allocation and dominant position abuse
are examples of such practices. See Articles 5 and 6 of the competition law.
16. Article 9 of the Competition Law defines an economic-concentration operation
as "any activity resulting in the full or partial transfer of ownership of or interest in
property or rights or shares or obligations of an enterprise to another, and which may
enable an enterprise or group of enterprises to control, directly or indirectly, another
enterprise or group of enterprises." Competition Law, No. 33, art. 9, Al-Jarida AlRasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at

http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/competition law.pdf; see also Firas Malhas, Jordan:
Economic Concentration-JordanianCompetition Law, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL AND
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5. Cooperate with similar entities outside the kingdom for
exchanging information and data in relation to applying
competition rules to the extent permitted by international
treaties.
6. Issue opinions that aim to clarify competition matters.
The Competition Affairs Committee is the advisory body of the
Competition Directorate.
The Competition Affairs Committee
chairperson is The Minister of Industry and Trade; other members of the
Committee represent several public and private sectors.' 8
The roles of this Committee are' 9 to provide advice on the general
competition strategy and to review matters related to the provisions of
the law.
B.

Markets ControlDirectorate

The task of the Markets Control Directorate is to implement
Industry & Trade Law No. 18 for Year 1998, and to implement the
Classification & Promotion regulations. The Markets Control Directorate
is the body responsible for ensuring that the private sector complies with
MIT policies. These policies aim to strengthen goods and services
marketplaces, and to organize market procedures that discourage such
marketplace abuses as holding fake sales and liquidations, offering
nonexistent prizes to customers, and hiding or refusing to sell basic
goods.20
Mar.
13,
2009, http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?
BUSINESS ASSOCIATES,
articleid=75568 (last visited Oct. 14, 2010).
17. Article 7(B) of the Competition Law states that by a reasoned decision on the
basis of a recommendation of the Director of the Competition Directorate, the Minister of
Industry and Trade may grant exemptions to some anti-competitive practices and
arrangements if they lead to positive results, with a common benefit that cannot be
achieved without the exemption, including the improvement of the competitive ability,
production or distribution systems of enterprises, or the provision of certain benefits to
the consumer. Competition Law, No. 33, art. 7(B) Al-Jarida AI-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE], No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/
portals/O/competition law.pdf.
18. Competition Law, No. 33, art. 14(A)(7) Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE], No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/O/competition_1aw.pdf (providing that the president of any
association named by the Minister is concerned with protecting the consumer should be a
member in the Committee for Competition Matters).
19. Competition Law, No. 33, art. 14(C) Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE],
No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/O/
competition law.pdf.
20. For additional information about the Quality and Market Controls Directorate,
see generally MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE, http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?
tabid-432 (last visited Oct. 16, 2010).
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The Markets Control Directorate has the following initiatives: 2 1
1. Determining the prices for any basic goods upon a
recommendation from the Prime Minister.
2. Ensuring the sale of goods as per publicized prices.
3. Checking available stock with wholesalers.
4. Monitoring the concealment of or denial of sale of basic
goods.
5. Monitoring clearance sales, liquidation, and promotional
prizes.
Consumer ProtectionPolicy

C.

So far, there is no governmental body responsible for consumerprotection issues in Jordan. Nevertheless, besides the important role that
the Markets Control Directorate plays, there are two consumer-protection
associations 22 working as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that
strive to provide the general public with essential information about
products and services available on the market. These NGOs use
brochures, pamphlets, media advertising, and awareness meetings open
to the public to educate people about products and services on the
market. The NGOs also stand against some producers who foist lowquality or high-priced products upon consumers. 23
D.

ConsumerProtection Law

At present, 24 there is no legislation that covers consumer-protection
issues25 in Jordan. Two pieces of consumer-protection legislation were

21.

Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, arts. 7, 8, 12 & 16, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya

[OFFICIAL GAZETTE],

No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan.

10,

1998)

(Jordan), available at

http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/551/Industry%20and%20Trade%2OLaw.aspx.
22. The National Society for Consumer Protection (NSCP) was established in 1989.
For additional information about the NACP, see generally http://www.beitalmoneh.org/?
change= 1.20Consumer%20Protection%20(NSCP). The Consumer Rights Association
was established in May 2009. Consumer Rights Association Opens Membership to
Citizens, ALGHAD NEWSPAPER, May 25, 2009, http://www.alghad.com/?news=420813.
23. The NACP periodically publishes price increases of products and requests that
the authorities investigate practices related thereto. For example, the NACP reviews food
pricing in situations where despite decreases in shipping costs, prices remain high. Price
Review Requirementfor Food Items Shipped at Low Wage, AL-RAl NEWSPAPER, Jan. 22,
2006, http://www.alrai.com/pages.php?newsid=75558.
24. Oct. 2010.
25. Salient consumer-protection issues in Jordan include the lack of a governmental
authority to oversee consumer protection, the marketing of commodities that are unfit for
human consumption, false offers of sale, unclear price listings, the absence of warranty
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drafted a few years ago and were discussed by several public authorities
and ministries, but no draft has managed to reach the doors of the
Parliament.2 6
Currently, the Ministry of Industry and Trade (MIT)27 is
undertaking an expanded consultation with several interested
governmental and non-governmental stakeholders. 2 8 The MIT and the
stakeholders are trying to use the Regulatory Impact Assessment29
method to set the main principles of consumer-protection policy in
Jordan. However, up to this moment nothing has been issued officially.30
The general objective of consumer-protection-policy consultation is
to reach an efficient consumer-protection policy that matches Jordanian
consumer interests. Laws or regulations could establish such a policy
officially.
III. COMPETITION POLICY AND CONSUMERS

Competition policy and consumer-protection policy have a deep
regulatory impact on the functioning of markets. The purpose of
competition law is to preserve and enhance the competitive structure of
markets for goods and services. Proper competition helps ensure that all
consumers who need a certain good or service will be able to obtain it at
a price which reflects the real cost of the good or service.31
commitments, the making of vague contracts, and misrepresentations about the quality of
commodities.
26. Al-Rai New Draft Law to Establish Consumer Protection Council & Tough
Sanctions, AL-RAI

NEWSPAPER,

Mar.

20,

http://www.alrai.com/pages.php?newsid=89197;
BUSINESS

MAGAZINE,

May

4,

2007,

2006,

see

Issue

also

12959.

available at

Unfair Deal, JORDAN

http://www.jordan-business.net/magazine/

index.php?option=corncontent&task=view&id=145&ltemid=45. The text of two drafts
is now available at the MIT website http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid-489 (last
visited Nov. 30, 2010).
27. The Economic Policy Directorate of the MIT, supported by SABEQ (The
USAID Jordan Economic Development Program), organizes this activity. The MIT can
propose a draft law to the government, which in turn can propose it to Parliament for
approval.
28. The governmental bodies represent both governmental institutes that are
interested in or that affect consumer issues, as well as non-governmental institutes.
29. A general working method could be summarized as follows: 1) A task-force
brainstorms about ways to identify consumer problems; 2) upon identifying a problem,
the team attempts to determine its cause(s); 3) the team consults stakeholders to search
for and assess practical solutions to the problems.
30. The author represents the Competition Directorate in the MIT Consumer
Protection Policy Task Force team.
31. See Fernando G6mez Pomar, EC Consumer Protection Law and EC Competition
Law: How relatedare they? A Law and Economics Perspective3 SECOLA Conferences,
LSE, London, Working Paper No. 113, May 16-17 2002, available at
www.raco.cat/index.php/InDret/article/viewFile/81192/105680 (last visited Nov. 14,
2010).

342

PENN STATE INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

In 2002 the MIT promulgated the Document of the Legal Motives
For Enacting the Competition Law, 32 setting forth multiple economic and
social objectives. The fundamental objectives, stated in the document,
are to protect competition, achieve a competitive market structure,
protect all market participants (including consumers),33 foster the
competitiveness of national enterprises and boost small enterprises. 34
The term "protection of competition" refers to the prevention of
private restrictive practices that might hinder or block competition, those
in the form of anti-competitive cooperation between market participants
as well as unilateral abuse of market power. 3 5
The main objectives of competition policy to some extent will
intersect with consumer-protection policy. While competition policy
pursues the efficient functioning of the market, consumer protection
works to ensure that consumers can make well-informed decisions and
that sellers will fulfill the promises they make about the products they
offer.36
"Economic performance in areas such as communications, public
procurement, and transportation affect the lives of consumers in
immediate and observable ways." 37
In many economies, cartels3 8 and bid-rigging arrangements in the
construction sector have raised the cost of, for example, the building of
roads and hospitals. As a result, the price that public agencies must pay

32. The Document clarifies the reasons why Jordan's government as a whole
believes the Competition Law is needed. See Ministry of Industry and Trade, Document
of the Legal Motive for Enacting the Competition Law 1 (2002) (unpublished document
obtained from the competition directorate, document date 2002, at 1).
33. The Document juxtaposes these objectives without any particular ranking of
priorities, and does not provide for a guidepost to the Competition Law enforcers as to
how to address these goals. However, it should be mentioned that the preparatory
documents for drafting the Competition Law perceived economic efficiency and
consumer welfare as the ultimate key objectives of the law. See Document of the Legal
Motive for Enacting the Competition Law 1 (2002) (unpublished document obtained
from the competition directorate); see also QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 42.
34.

See QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 42.

35. See id at 43.
36. See Daniel Agustino, Competition, Consumer Protection, and Objective of
Competition Law, Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU), 1,
3 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2006-11/03
Indonesia.pdf.
37. William E. Kovacic, Competition Policy, Consumer Protection, and Economic
Disadvantage, 25 J. L. & POL'Y 101, 105 (2007), available at http://law.wustl.edu/
Journal/25/Kovacic.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
38. A cartel is where competing firms agree to cooperatively engage in
uncompetitive practices such as price fixing. Cartels are illegal in Jordan. See
Competition Law, No. 33, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No. 4673 at 4157
(Sept.
1, 2004)
(Jordan),
available at
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/O/
competitionlaw.pdf.
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to provide services has increased. Cartel overcharges can account for a
ten percent or more rise in the total value of a specific procurement. 39
One objective of the Competition Law is to create a climate
conducive to businesses through the stimulation of business competition
by preventing anti-competitive business practices. Ultimately, the
prevention of anti-competitive business practices will safeguard the
public interest, improve the efficiency of Jordan's economy, and increase
the consumer welfare.40
Another objective of the Competition Law is to preserve and
promote competition as a means of ensuring the efficient allocation of
resources, which in turn results in better quality products and services,
more choices and lower prices for consumers. 41
The removal of artificial barriers to new entrepreneurs entering the
market and the proliferation of small enterprises can generate particularly
strong benefits for consumers. 42
The lessening of anticompetitive practices will help to end the
exploitation of consumers. Consumers benefit when monopolistic and
collusive business practices are curtailed. Therefore, when competitive
43
market structures are established, consumers are the big winners.
Several substantive provisions of the Competition Law embrace the
promotion of consumer welfare. For example:
1. Article 7(B)44 explicitly requires enterprises seeking to
exempt an agreement or a practice from the requirements of
Articles 545 and 646 to show that the agreement or the
47
practice in question achieves certain benefits to consumers.
39. See Kovacic, supra note 37, at 106.
40. See International Co-operation Program on Competition Policy, The Interface of
Consumer Protection and Competition Laws and Policies 9 (2006), available at
http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2006-ll/03-21ndonesia.pdf (last visited
Nov. 14, 2010).
41. See QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 57. See also Kovacic, supra note 37, at 105.
42. See Kovacic, supra note 37, at 105.
43. See Pomar, supra note 31, at 3.
44. This provision is similar to the second requirement of Art 81(3) EC Treaty which
provides that anticompetitive agreements, concerted practices or decisions of associations
of undertakings may be cleared if they contribute to (improving the production or
distribution of goods or to promoting of technical or economic progress, while allowing
consumers a fair share of the resulting benefits). See QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 57-58.
45. Article 5 prohibits practices, alliances or agreements, especially price-fixing
schemes and collusive bidding practices, that limit, contravene or prevent competition.
See id.
46. Article 6 forbids businesses that enjoy dominant market position from abusing
that position. Article 2 defines "dominant position" as when a business can control and
affect market activity.
47. From 2002 to 2010, the Competition Directorate received nine exemption
requests and approved three of them. More information about Competition Directorate
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2. Article 11(A)(1) 4 8 entrusts the Minister of Industry and Trade
with clearing concentration transactions if their competitive
effects outweigh their anticompetitive effects, for example,
when they lead to lower prices.
3. Article 14(A)(7) provides that the Minister of Industry and
Trade may appoint one president of a consumer-protection
association to the Competition Affairs Committee.
The president of the Consumer Protection Society is a member of the
Committee for Competition Matters,so so the consumer protection
association, which represents a high percentage of Jordanian consumers,
participates in the planning and implementing of the general competition
strategy.5'
4.

Article 17(A) states that private-sector enterprises, licensed
consumer-protection associations, and any group of at least
five consumers who have suffered harm can directly
complain to the public prosecutors regarding to any
violation of the Competition Law.52

Therefore, according to the Competition Law, consumers can start
the judicial process directly by lodging a formal complaint with the
public prosecutors.
activities is available at the MIT website. See Ministry of Industry & Trade,
http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=805. (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
48. This is similar to the efficiency defense for clearing mergers under the EC
competition rules. See Guidelines on the assessment of horizontal mergers under the
Council Regulation on the control of concentrations between undertakings (2004/C
31/03) Official Journal of the European Union
79-84 (Feb. 5, 2004), available at
http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2004:031:0005:0018:EN:P
DF (last visited Nov. 14, 2010). See also QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 57-58.
49. From the years 2003 to 2009, the competition directorate received forty-five
economic concentration requests in several sectors. See Ministry of Industry & Trade,
http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid=804 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
50. See Ministry of Industry and Trade, Competition Directorate 2007 Annual
Report, 28, available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/Annual%20Report%20E%
202007copy.pdf (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
51. The role of the Competition Affairs Committee had been mentioned before.
52. According to Competition Directorate annual reports the Jordanian courts
received three complaints from enterprises between 2003 and 2007. See MINISTRY OF
INDUSTRY

AND

TRADE,

Competition Directorate Annual Reports

(2003-2007),

http://www.mit.gov.jofDefault.aspx?tabid= 1176 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
53. Article 17(B) Industry & Trade Law No. 33 of the Year 2004, mentions that
"[i]n all cases the Ministry of Industry and Trade shall be a party in all competition cases,
and it may submit any studies or comments to the court and request to continue hearing
such cases, even where the parties referred to in paragraph (A) of this Article have
dropped their case or have settled their dispute, and it may contest any decisions issued in

2010]

A.

COMPETITION POLICY AND CONSUMER PROTECTION POLICY

345

Consumer Protectionand Competition

Consumer-protection policy is an important complement to
competition policy. 54
Competition policy alone will not fully safeguard consumer
interests. It is useless to have low-priced products on the market, if these
products are unsafe and may harm consumers. It is also useless to have
wide choices for consumers if consumers cannot make a properly
informed choice because, for example, shelves lack pricing information,
products lack clear and adequate labeling, or salespersons misleadingly
advertise or make misrepresentations about their products.5 5
The most valuable contribution of a consumer protection program is
giving consumers confidence in the marketplace by preventing serious
fraud. False advertising and deceptive marketing practices can damage
the capacity of honest merchants to attract consumers. If individuals fear
they are prone to being cheated in many or most ordinary transactions,
they will be inclined to take costly precautions and will end up
purchasing less. 56
Competition policy does not provide solutions to several important
consumer problems. For example, protection against unfair terms in
standard consumer contracts accepted unknowingly or reluctantly by the
consumer or against contracts concluded by consumers at a distance from
the supplier on the basis of incomplete information on the product and on
the trustworthiness of the supplier is something outside of the
Competition Law's scope.57
By analyzing the two drafts of consumer-protection law, 8 it could
be noted that the general objectives of Jordanian consumer protection

include :59
Creating a consumer-protection system containing legal
certainty and transparency, and access to information.

these cases." Competition Law, No. 33, art. 17(B) AI-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAzETTE], No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/competition_1aw.pdf.
54. See Kovacic, supra note 37, at 114.
55.

See Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, The Interface Between

Competition and Consumer Policies, Contribution from Malta 4, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/63/39792321.pdf.
56.

See Kovacic, supra note 37, at 114-115.

57.

See Affairs, supra note 55.

58. The
text
of two drafts
are available
at
the
MIT
website,
http://www.mit.govjo/Default.aspx?tabid-489.
59. See MINISTRY OF INDUSTRY AND TRADE, Competition Directorate:Introduction,

http://www.mit.gov.jo/Default.aspx?tabid= 1174 (last visited Nov. 14, 2010).
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* Improving the awareness and independence of consumers to
protect themselves.
* Empowering consumers to select, determine and claim their
rights as consumers.
* Developing entrepreneurs' awareness of the importance of
consumer protection and thus foster honest, responsible
entrepreneurial conduct.
Jordan's Industry and Trade Law No. 18 for Year 199860 covers
some consumer interests. For example, Article 4(B)(1) of the Industry
and Trade Law mentions that the MIT shall be the body responsible for
observing markets in order to protect national interests and verify
adherence to the provisions of Industry and Trade Law.6 ' Also,
according to the Document of Legal Motives for Enacting the Industry
62
and Trade Law, consumer welfare is one of the national interests.
Consumer welfare refers to the benefits and interests that consumers
would attain from competitive markets in the form of increased output,
lower prices, better products and wider selection of products or
*63
services.
Article 4 tasks the MIT with taking the necessary actions to
organize competition and protect consumers in accordance with Jordan's
laws.64
Article 4(B)(3) says that the MIT is the body responsible for
organizing the sale of basic materials,65 setting prices for these materials,
and exporting the surplus.66
Article 7(B) mentions that the MIT markets observers' tasks are to:

60. See Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 4, Al-Jarida AI-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan.
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/55 1/Industry%20and%20Trade%2OLaw.aspx.
61. See id. at art. 4(B)(1),
62. Unpublished document obtained from Ministry of Industry and Trade, p. I
(1998) (on file with author).
63.

QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 54.

64. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 4, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan.
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/551/Industry%20and%20Trade%20Law.aspx.
65. Article 2 of the Industry and Trade law defines "basic materials" as materials
that the Cabinet deems, in accordance with the law, to be basic. Industry & Trade Law,
No. 18, art. 2, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan. 10,
at
available
(Jordan),
1998)
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/551 /Industry%20and%2OTrade
%20Law.aspx.
66. Id. at art. 4(B)(3).
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* verify the sale of basic materials and commodities transacted
in the market according to the prices determined by the
Cabinet, and
* ensure that the materials are suitable for human
consumption.
Article 11(A) requires each trader to put a clear price list in a visible
place that specifies the price of each item the trader is offering for sale,
even if the prices are set by official regulations; moreover, according to
the same article, traders shall not be allowed to charge more than the
listed price.68
Article 11(B) requires wholesalers to provide the customer with a
receipt after the purchase; the receipt must show the type of the
purchased item, the quantity, and price.69 Article 11(B) also requires
retailers to give customers a copy of the receipt upon request. 70
Article 16(A) sets punishments to be imposed on any of the
following activities:
1. Selling or storing any expired commodity or a commodity
unsuitable for human consumption.
2. Hiding or refusing to sell any basic commodities or selling
any commodity at a price higher than the prices set in
accordance with Article (11)(A). 71
Article 12(A)(1) prohibits any person from announcing clearancesale offers without following the legal measures required by the MIT. 72
Article 12(A)(2) prohibits any person from announcing sale offers on
67. Id. at art. 7(B).
68. Article 13 of the Industry and Trade Law sets payment fine of at least 30 JD and
not exceeding 300 JD to be imposed for any violation to any of the provisions of Article
11. See id. at art. 11(A).
69. Id. at art. 11(B). The wholesaler must keep a copy of this receipt for a period not
less than two years. Id.
70. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 11(B), Al-Jarida AI-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan. 10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
http://www.mit.govjo/portals/0/tabid/55 I/Industry%20and%2OTrade%2OLaw.aspx.
71. See id. at art. 16(A). Between January 1, 2009, and June 30, 2009, Jordan's
Markets Control Directorate issued 6,760 violation reports, including 5,726 violations for
not declaring the prices, 864 for increasing prices, 89 for illusive sales and offers, 74 for
refusing to sell basic commodities, six for non-cooperation with the official employees
and one for refusing to provide receipt to buyer. Ministry of Industry issued 6760 offenses
during the first half Al Ghad daily newspaper, iss. 1780 Sept. 7, 2009, available at
http://www.alghad.com/index.php/rss/rss.php?news=432194.
72. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 12(A)(1), AI-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan.
http://www.mit.govjo/portals/0/tabid/55 1/Industry%20and%20Trade%2OLaw.aspx.
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commodities where the prices are not actually less than the prices before
the sale.73
Moreover, Article 12(A)(4) prohibits anyone from offering free
rewards according to specified conditions and then denying that these
conditions were met. 74 The same provision prevents any person from
honoring fewer rewards than were advertised or otherwise cheating in the
granting of these awards. In addition, according to Article 12(A)(5), no
person may organize or promote a program membership which is based
on payment of an up-front fee that does not impart a direct or indirect
financial benefit upon the payer.
In this regard, Article 8(B)(2) of the Competition Law permits the
resale of commodities below their actual purchase price only when the
seller is liquidating his or her business, or is moving inventory in order to
free up shelf space for new, lower-priced inventory.77
Article 18(A) of the Industry and Trade Law provides that the
owner and manager of any store where violations of the Industry and
Trade Law occur will be liable, depending on the facts of the particular
situation.7
If we consider that the core objective of consumer-protection policy
consists of preventing sellers from increasing sales by lying about their
products or by engaging in unfair practices such as unilateral breaches of

73. Id. at art. 12(A)(2).
74. Id. at art. 12(A)(4).
75. Id.
76. Id. at art. 12(A)(5). Article 14 of the Industry and Trade Law sets a fine of at
least 500 JD and not exceeding 3,000 JD for any violation of any of the provisions of
items (1), (2), or (3) of paragraph (A) of Article 12. Article 15(A) mandates a fine of not
less than 1,000 JD and not exceeding 10,000 JD and imprisonment for a period of not less
than three months and not exceeding one year for any violation of the provisions of item
(4) and (5) of paragraph (A) of Article 12. Moreover, the person violating the law must
repay all returns acquired from these activities.
77. Competition Law, No. 33, art. 8(B)(2), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE], No. 4673 at 4157 (Sept. 1, 2004) (Jordan), available at
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/competition_1aw.pdf. Article 22 of the Competition Law
sets a fine of at least 200 JD but not exceeding 20,000 JD to be imposed for any violation
of Article 8 of the Competition Law. Id. at art. 22.
78. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 18(A), Al-Jarida AI-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan.
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/551/Industry%20and%20Trade%2OLaw.aspx.
Article 17 of the Industry and Trade Law mentions that the punishment shall be
maximized if the violation was repeated for one time, and if repeated within three years
for more than once, the punishment would be the maximum fine and imprisonment for a
period not less than the minimum imprisonment period as defined in the punishment and
not exceeding its maximum as indicated in articles 14, 15 and 16 of Industry and Trade
Law. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 17, Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL GAZETTE],

No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan. 10, 1998) (Jordan), available at http://www.mit.gov.jo/
portals/0/tabid/55 I/Industry%20and%20Trade%2OLaw.aspx.
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contract or unauthorized billings,7 9 then it is obvious that the above
articles do not protect all consumer interests. Several issues, including
warranty observance and other after-sale services, must be covered by
regulations and official procedures.
Furthermore, the right of access to information should be expanded
to other issues besides the price lists mandated by Article I1(A).80 For
example, this right should be expanded to include access to information
about the origin of a product and its contents. Another area that the
Ministry of Industry and Trade should seek to regulate is trade contracts:
presently, traders have no legal obligation to write consumer contracts in
clear and understandable language. Small font size or unclear phrases or
sentences will make the contracts' conditions less comprehensible.
In addition, the Industry and Trade Law does not cover credibility
about the quality of commodities. Traders may use frills to make their
goods seem much better than they actually are in the eyes of consumers.
Moreover, because there is no governmental body directly in charge
of consumer issues in Jordan, if traders trick consumers, the only way for
consumers to seek a remedy is to complain to the jurisdiction authority in
the hopes of obtaining adequate compensation according to the Jordanian
civil law. This will take a lot of time and will cost a lot of money.8'
Considering these issues, the consumer policy will lead to the
improvement of the quality of goods and services and may guarantee the
sustainability of both the production of goods and services and the
comfort, security and safety of consumers. 82
However, it is important to consider that what constitutes the benefit
of consumers is not something that everyone will agree upon, and that it
can be understood in different forms. 83 Some consumer-protection
actions may improve consumer outcomes but may have detrimental

79. Daniel Agustino, Competition, Consumer Protection, and Objective of
Competition Law, Commission for the Supervision of Business Competition (KPPU), 1,
3 (Aug. 2006), available at http://www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/200611/03Indonesia.pdf.
80. Industry & Trade Law, No. 18, art. 11(A), Al-Jarida Al-Rasmiya [OFFICIAL
GAZETTE], No. 4304 at 3782 (Jan. 10, 1998) (Jordan), available at
http://www.mit.gov.jo/portals/0/tabid/551/Industry%20and%20Trade%2OLaw.aspx.
81. According to the Jordanian Ministry of Justices, the duration of the proceedings
in the Jordanian courts is 277 days for civil cases. See Ministry ofJustice: Significant
Reduction in the Resolution and JudgmentalDurationIndicators, Alghad newspaper, No.
1649, Feb. 28, 2009, available at http://www.alghad.com/index.php/rss/frame.php?
news=399588.
82. See Fernando G6mez Pomar, EC Consumer ProtectionLaw and EC Competition
Law: How related are they? 4 (Law and Economics Perspective Working Paper No. 113,
2002), availableat http://www.raco.cat/index.php/InDret/article/viewFile/81192/105680.
83. See id. at 3, 4.
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effects on competition.84 For example, price fixing and organization
supply for basic goods will affect competition even if the government
sets the price of these goods. But in this regard the Jordanian
government prefers to consider consumer interest as more important than
competition, aiming to prevent any possible negative effect that could be
caused by a vendor's abusing the importance of basic goods to
consumers. Moreover, requirements that providers of particular types of
goods and services satisfy health and safety standards will raise the cost
of the goods and services they provide, and such requirements may
constrain competition.
On the other hand, some might say that requirements on providers
of particular types of goods and services to satisfy health and safety
standards will raise the quality of products and services and will ensure
advantages for consumers, but it is important to consider that consumers
look for two elements: quality and price.
B.

Differences between Consumer-Protectionand Competition
Policies

There are important differences between consumer-protection and
competition policies. They are different in their objectives, enforcement
approaches and institutions, violations and correction, and
development.8 5
1.

Core Objectives

The core objectives of the competition policy are to ensure that
markets work according to market forces and to provide consumers with
a competitive range of product or service options. In contrast, the core
objective of the consumer-protection policy is to ensure that consumers
have the information they need to choose effectively from among those
options, with their purchasing decisions unimpaired by, for example,
coercion, deception or the withholding of important information. 8 6

84. See Sam Di Scerni, Speech to The International Cooperation Program on
Competition Policy (The Interface Between Competition and Consumer Policies) (Sept.
I1, 2006), transcript available at www.apeccp.org.tw/doc/APEC-OECD/2006-11/04
Australia.pdf.
85. Derek Ireland, Competition Policy and Consumer Protection, POLICY OPTIONs,
Oct. 1997, at 27-28, availableat http://www.irpp.org/po/archive/oct97/ reland.pdf.
86. See Gesner de Oliveira & Sdrgio Goldbaum, Relations Between Regulation,
Competition Policy & Consumer Protection in Telecommunications, Electricity and
http://virtualbib.fgv.br/dspace/bitstream/handle/10438/
Water Supply, 2 (2001),
1867/TDI07.pdf~sequence=I.
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Enforcement Approaches and Institutions

The Competition Directorate enforces competition policy in a
highly selective and reactive manner in response to complaints and
investigations. In contrast, the enforcement of consumer-protection
policy involves direct intervention by several consumer-protection
associations and the Markets Control Directorate.
3.

Violations and Corrections

Competition-policy violations stem from market failures such as the
abuse of economic power, entry barriers, and natural monopolies. These
elements are external to consumers and can be corrected within the
sphere of competition policy, whereas consumer-protection violations,
which negatively affect consumers' ability to choose freely among the
options, stem from other market failures,87 which can be corrected within
the sphere of consumer protection. 88
4.

Development

Competition policy is usually developed and modernized based on
long-term processes that include detailed analysis 89 of market forces and
stakeholder"o consultations,91 as well as benchmarking with major
trading partners. In contrast, consumer-protection policies tend to be
developed more quickly in response to a perceived market failure or
economic crisis.

87. See Haitham Abu Karaki, The Interface Between Competition and Consumer
Policies: Contributionfrom Jordan, Submitted to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development [OECD], Seventh Global Forum on Competition,
17,
2007),
available at
Jordan, at
3
(Dec.
Contribution from
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/41/39792264.pdf. Other market failures include situations
where market transactions and outcomes fail to serve the consumer interest, economic
efficiency and a nation state's productivity and competitiveness. See id
88. See Ireland, supranote 85, at 28; de Oliveira & Goldbaum, supranote 86, at 2.
89. Competition policy could be developed through an analysis of the forces existing
in the market and their commitment to competition law. A program called Statistical
Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) helps the decision-maker in the Competition
Agency identify weaknesses in the Agency's work to develop better laws.
90. Stakeholders include all relevant agencies that serve the work of the Competition
Directorate. For example in Jordan, the Customs Department, Tax Department, and
Companies Control Department are among the various ministries that can provide
information that helps the Directorate work.
91. Stakeholder consultations are a kind of coordination between official
departments and are held on an as-needed basis. For example, a stakeholder consultation
may occur when there is an issue that requires the cooperation of the Tax Department and
the Directorate. Consultations affect and develop the Directorate's work through
stakeholder suggestions.
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Moreover, competition policy can develop and become formalized
through bilateral and multilateral agreements between the competition
authorities and through bilateral cooperation and the exchange of
information between them. 92
C.

The Harmony FactorsBetween Competition Policy and ConsumerProtectionPolicy

Despite the differences between the competition policy and
consumer-protection policy, there are also some harmony factors
between them. These factors are summarized below.
The long-term objectives of both competition policy and consumerprotection policy could be understood as the enhancement of consumer
sovereignty welfare, as well as effective consumer choice. Both policies
address-albeit in different ways-market-failure scenarios where
market transactions and outcomes fail to serve consumer interests and
promote economic efficiency. 9 3 While these long-term objectives seem
to converge, they are not identical. But, importantly, they could be
considered as an indication for the harmony factors between the two
policies.9 4
Enforcement of the Competition Law in the marketplace will lead to
better consumer information and choices, and a better-informed and
more demanding consumer who is prepared to make his or her
preferences clearly known to suppliers, and thereby stimulate greater
competition and more product choice. Therefore, one might note that in
circumstances where there is little or no competition in the market, there
may be greater justification for intervention to maintain consumer
Alternatively, overly burdensome consumer-protection
welfare.
regulations can impede market entry and thus reduce market competition
and product choice.95
It is true that consumer-protection policy, more often than the
Competition Law, is associated with social objectives, but the
Competition Law can also have objectives that are not founded on
economic-efficiency criteria.96
It could be noticed that consumer-protection and competition
policies interact to promote and protect consumers' economic interests.
Moreover, the thread that connects competition policy and consumer
protection is the attainment of consumer welfare, in addition to
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

See Ireland,supra note 5, at 28.
Id. at 28-29.
QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 57.
Scerni, supra note 84, at 2.
Ireland, supra note 5, at 28.
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promoting competitive markets, competitiveness and, ultimately, growth
and development. 9 7
Therefore, both competition and consumerprotection policies should be based on rigorous marketplace analysis"
and a sound understanding of competitive dynamics and corporate
strategy between the two policies to ensure that unacceptable company
behavior is not confused with legitimate corporate strategy aimed at
increasing profits and market share. 9 9
Many tools can be used to ensure that competition policy and
consumer-protection policy can work in harmony. For example: 00
* Public education programs aimed at assisting producers and
consumers understand their rights and responsibilities can be
implemented. Markets can perform better if both consumers
and producers are well informed.
* Strengthening the enforcement of both competition and
consumer-protection policies by launching investigations
into any possible breaches of the competition and consumerprotection regulations, and implementing the necessary
procedures to resolve competition and consumer-protection
issues, including legal action, where appropriate.
* Applying a strict mergers policy that prohibits anticompetitive mergers.
* Promoting competition-policy exemptions when certain
conduct could lead to real public benefits. This action will
achieve balance between the competition policy and
consumer interests.
D.

Governmental Organizations: Competition & Consumer Protection
Agency

As mentioned previously, the MIT plays a key role in applying the
Jordanian economic policy. This includes the competition policy and
consumer-protection policy, which the Competition and Market Control
directorates apply. In addition, I mentioned above that there is no clear
consumer policy that protects all consumer interests in Jordan.
Therefore, I believe that the MIT could enhance competition and
consumer-protection functions of Jordan's economic policy by

97. QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 57. See also Agustino, supra note 36, at 3.
98. "Marketplace analysis" refers to an analysis of whether market forces are in
compliance with the Competition Law. The Statistical Package for the Social Sciences
(SPSS) Competition Agency would conduct such a market analysis.
99. See Ireland,supra note 5, at 28-29.
100. Scerni, supra note 84, at 4.
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combining the Competition and Market Control directorates within one
agency.
According to this idea, Competition and Market Control directorates
should be combined in one independent governmental agency which
should be the body responsible for implementing competition and
consumer-protection functions.
Several advantages could be reached if an independent agency was
established to apply the competition and consumer-protection policies.
One of the advantages would be the avoidance of political influence on
the agency's work. 0 ' The extent of political interference in the
competition and consumer-protection policy could be decreased by
making the agency more independent and improving its structure,
functions, decision-making power and financial independence.1 0 2
Other benefits could be achieved by combining both functions in a
single public institution:' 0 3
1. Consumers in Jordan would have a governmental body
directly concerned with their interests.
2. Performing the consumer-protection function will provide
the Competition and Consumer Protection Agency with
useful insights into how the Agency should execute
competition policy in the best possible way for

consumers.104
3. In several important instances, enforcing the policy
concerning advertising and marketing practices has
improved our understanding of how markets operate. 0 5
4. Having a single entity handle consumer-protection and
competition functions will lead to harmonious decisions

QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 41.
102. It should be noted that separating competition policy from political influence
could not be fully envisaged in Jordan because priorities that are set for implementing
competition and consumer policy rules will compare with other social or economic
considerations. See QALYOUBI, supra note 9, at 41.
103. Seventh Global Forum on Competition, Contribution from Jordan, supra note
87, at 3.
104. The idea here is that competition and consumer-protection policies are related
together, so if a single government body applies both policies, the body can locate points
of integration between these policies and use them to avoid conflict and contradiction.
105. Combining the consumer-protection and competition functions in a single
government agency would create increased insight into what products and services are
being offered to consumers and about how the markets are working. Bringing both
functions under one government agency would allow Jordan's Government more
effectively to monitor advertising activities and thereby protect against false offers or
anticompetitive practices.

101.
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whose effects on markets, competition and consumers are
properly and comprehensively accounted for.
Appropriately applying the competition and consumerthe
protection policies together can reinforce'
competitive pressures that force sellers to respond
attentively to consumer preferences. 107
The consumer-protection policy can borrow heavily from
competition enforcement experience in designing
strategies for working against uncompetitive practices. 08
Market observers will track marketplace violations during
their fieldwork;109 this will provide the agency fieldwork
team with valuable experience in Jordanian markets." 0
The consumer-protection and competition policies could
This
be applied by one agency without conflict.
costs.
effort
and
time,
save
would
application

Several successful examples around the world show that enforcing
competition policy and consumer protection through one independent
agency can work. Examples include the Federal Trade Commission in
the United States,"' the Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom,"12

106. Competition policy will address pricing issues, while the consumer-protection
policy will address product-quality issues and other consumer interests. Implementing
both policies through one body would spur competition, which would cause traders to
improve the quality of their wares and to pay increased attention to consumers' interests
in order to attract customers. Thus, implementing both policies under one government
body would be in consumers' best interests.
107. Timothy J. Muris, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Prepared Remarks at the
Fordham Corporate Law Institutes Twenty-Ninth Annual Conference on International
Antitrust Law and Policy: The Interface of Competition and Consumer Protection, at 24
(Oct. 31, 2002), availableat www.ftc.gov/speeches/muris/ 02103 1fordham.pdf.
108. Id.
109. Fieldwork refers to field visits to check for market irregularities.
110. Ideally, the Agency would have field teams to investigate allegations of market
abuses. The Competition Directorate is suffering from a limited number of staff. At the
end of 2009, the Directorate had only 14 employees-only 10 of whom are entitled to
deal with competition issues. Combining both directorates would help address this
staffing shortage.
111. See Federal Trade Commission, Bureau of Consumer Protection,
http://www.fic.gov/bcp/about.shtm (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
112. See Office of Fair Trading, Consumer Protection, http://www.oft.gov.uk/
9
OFTwork/consumer-protection/jsessionid=6C564399D86E5275 2 E 4 87 106A9E60ED
(last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
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the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission," 3 the Japan Fair
Trade Commission,l 14 and the Korean Fair Trade Commission.'15
Any singular competition and consumer-protection agency would
have to establish more balanced policies for consumers. A central
agency with regional offices would be required. A consultative body
consisting of local experts on consumer issues, including local
governorates,11 6 local councils and consumer groups, would also need to
be formed so as to promote consumer policies and to protect the rights of
those who lack the capacity to resolve consumer problems by offering
counseling services and educational programs and by preparing measures
to ensure consumer safety. Above all, a competition and consumerprotection agency would establish effective legal criteria by which fast
and effective damage redress could be granted in response to consumer
harm." 7
Moreover, the agency would have to lay the ground for a practical
and comprehensive consumer education. The agency would need to
develop an index to objectively measure consumers' capacity for
reasonable consumption," 8 which would be utilized to design consumereducation programs focused on the weaknesses and problems of
consumers.1
A strong competition and consumer-protection agency with
adequate penalties and remedies in its armory and the willingness to use
them would ensure a high degree of competition and consumer welfare
in the marketplace.' 20
The agency would need to develop an improved methodology for
market investigations aimed at applying remedial measures to solve
competition and consumer-protection problems. This methodology
113. See Australian Competition & Consumer Commission, For Consumers,
http://www.accc.gov.au/content/index.phtml/itemid/815215 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
114. See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD],
Seventh Global Forum on Competition, Contributionfrom Japan, at 3 (Dec. 19, 2007),
available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/43/39808695.pdf.
Republic of Korea, Organization,
Commission,
115. See Fair Trade
http://eng.ftc.go.kr/about/organization.jsp?pageld=0 103 (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).
116. Jordan is divided into 12 administrative parts called govemates.
117. See Korea Fair Trade Commission [KFTC), Consumer Policy Development
available at
2007),
16,
(April
at 2-3
Measures of the KFTC,
ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/20070607 102444.pdf. See also OECD, Seventh Global Forum on
Competition, Contribution from Japan, at 2-3 (Dec. 19, 2007), available at
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/6/43/39808695.pdf.
118. Reasonable consumption is non-excessive consumption founded on a scientific,
logical basis.
119. Korea Fair Trade Commission [KFTC], Consumer Policy Development
Measures of the KFTC, at 6 (April 16, 2007), available at ftc.go.kr/data/hwp/
20070607 102444.pdf.
120. Scemi, supra note 84, at 6.
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would do well to focus on identifying and assessing consumer
detriment, 12 and to draw on all available analytical tools in order to
detect uncompetitive practices and consumer-protection violations.122
On the other hand, the involvement of consumer organizations is
very important to increase the effectiveness of competition and
consumer-protection market investigations. Such involvement could be
achieved by permitting consumer organizations to file formal complaints
about competition and consumer problems. 12 3
CONCLUSION

The MIT plays a key role in applying Jordanian economic policies.
The MIT implements several regulations, and it is the body responsible
for applying competition and consumer-protection policies. The MIT
implements the competition policy through the Competition Directorate
and works to ensure that consumer interests will be protected through the
directorate of Markets Control.
To date, there is no consumer-protection law in Jordan. Nor is there
is a governmental body directly in charge of consumer issues. However,
the MIT is trying to set the main principles of consumer-protection
policy.
Competition policy and consumer-protection policy have a deep
regulatory impact on the functioning of markets. Perfect competition
ensures that all consumers who need a certain good or service will obtain
it at the price which reflects its real cost. Lessening anticompetitive
practices will lead to the end of consumer exploitation.
Consumer welfare is enshrined indirectly in the substantive
provisions of the Competition Law. Nevertheless, competition policy
alone will not fully safeguard consumer interests.
The Industry and Trade Law covers some consumer interests but not
all of them. Several issues need to be covered in order to improve the
quality of goods and services for consumers, and this may guarantee the
sustainability of the production of goods and services, as well as the
comfort, security and safety of consumers.

121. Consumer detriment refers to a method for calculating the financial costs to
consumers and to the economy as a whole when problems occur. See Peter Lunt, The
Psychology of Consumer Detriment, Office of Fair Trading, at 1 (Jan. 2006), availableat
http://eprints.soton.ac.uk/148227/1/The Psychology of Consumer_ Detriment.pdf.
122. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECDI, Seventh
Global Forum on Competition, Contributionfrom United Kingdom, at 7 (Jan. 10, 2008),
available at www.oecd.org/dataoecd/40/11/39875978.pdf.
See Alasdair Murray,
Consumers and EU Competition Policy, Center for European Reform, 1, 1 (Sept. 2005),
availableat www.cer.org.uk/pdf/policybriefconsumers.pdf.
123. See Murray, supra note 122, at 1-4.
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There are important differences between consumer-protection
policy and the competition policy. The two policies are different in their
objectives, enforcement approaches and in the institutions applying them.
Moreover, they investigate different types violations and strive to correct
violations differently. Thus, the two policies develop differently.
There are some harmony factors between the competition policy
and consumer-protection policy. Their long-term objectives seem to
converge. Although these objectives are not identical, they are properly
understood as sharing important characteristics. The two policies
interact to promote and protect consumers' economic interests by
attaining consumer welfare and promoting competitive markets. Many
tools are used to ensure that competition and consumer protection can
work in harmony.
I believe that that the Competition and Market Control directorates
should be combined in one independent governmental agency. This
governmental agency would be the body responsible for implementing
competition and consumer-protection functions. This agency would be
required to cooperate with consumer organizations, support these
organizations, develop balanced competition and consumer policies, and
fill the gaps in competition and consumer-protection policies.
The agency could fulfill these requirements by applying competition
and consumer-protection policies through counseling services and
education programs, preparing measures to ensure consumer safety and
damage redress and developing an improved methodology for market
investigations, aiming to use remedial measures to solve competition and
consumer-protection problems.
The Jordanian government should satisfy consumers' needs by
establishing a well-organized marketplace and eliciting advantages from
the positive synergies between the competition and consumer-protection
policies. Bringing the competition and consumer-protection policies
under a single government agency would have a positive social impact
and improve the business environment in Jordan, as well.

